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INTRODUCTION 
Most Indians cannot easily obtain justice through India’s 
formal court system.1 Lok Adalats (“LAs”) are informal courts of 
first impression interspersed throughout India, which provide 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) services designed to 
                                                                                                                                     
  J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. Economics, 2007, 
University of Chicago. The author would like to thank Professor Nolan-Haley for input 
and advice, and his friends and family for their support. 
1. See SARFARAZ AHMED KHAN, LOK ADALAT: AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION MECHANISM 14 (2006) (noting that the issues with the formal adversarial 
system in India has made it inaccessible to seventy percent of the rural population); id. 
at 2 (noting that the formal system “failed to fulfil[l] the constitutional goal of access to 
justice and equal justice to all because of the docket of cases and on the other hand it 
becomes inaccessible because of the exorbitant costs of the proceedings . . . .”); see also 
Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal Rights 
in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE 
RULE OF LAW 96, 100–01 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (noting how 
formal courts in India provide very little “remedy, protection, and vindication” to the 
public). 
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address this problem by bringing justice to the public.2 Lok 
Adalat means “people’s court” in Hindi, one of the official 
languages of India.3 LAs provide the only point of access to the 
justice system of India for many citizens that operate in rural 
and remote regions. 4  Additionally, LAs are one of India’s 
principal means of providing ADR mechanisms to its citizens.5 
LAs allow parties to overcome economic, organizational, and 
procedural barriers that would otherwise prevent them from 
accessing justice. 6  As a result, the LA system is currently 
established throughout India.7 
                                                                                                                                     
2. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor”: Access to Justice and 
the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 790–91 (2004) (detailing how the 
Lok Adalat (“LA”) system has improved access to justice for the public); see also Sarah 
Leah Whitson, “Neither Fish, Nor Flesh, Nor Good Red Herring” Lok Adalats: An Experiment 
in Informal Dispute Resolution in India, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 391, 391 
(1992) (explaining how LAs became popularized as the country focused on the Indian 
Constitution’s mandate to the national government to promote modern values of 
equality). 
3. Hindi translation of “people’s court,” GOOGLE TRANSLATE, 
http://translate.google.com (translate “people’s court” from English into Hindi, with 
the result of “जनता की अदालत,” and then translate “जनता की अदालत” from Hindi 
back into English, with the result of “people’s court”). See INDIA CONST. art. 343, § 1, 
cl. 1 (designating Hindi, in Devanagari script, as one of the official languages of India). 
4. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 1, at 96 (contrasting the effectiveness of the 
formal courts versus the informal courts such as LAs and noting that although the high 
courts have been accessible, this means little if LAs and other forms of local justice 
cannot provide access to the people at the first instance); see also PRABHA BHARGAVA, 
LOK ADALAT: JUSTICE AT THE DOOR-STEPS 2–4 (1998) (describing how LAs allow people 
to stay in their village and not travel to a large town in order to get access to justice).  
5. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 391 (explaining how LAs could “indigenize” legal 
proceedings); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 798 (highlighting the non-
adversarial nature of LAs and how they embrace informality and tradition). 
6. NADJA ALEXANDER, Global Trends in Mediation: Riding the Third Wave, in GLOBAL 
TRENDS IN MEDIATION 10 (2nd ed. 2006) (noting that LAs “[empower] parties to 
overcome economic, organisational and procedural obstacles to justice”); see also 
Whitson, supra note 2, at 400 (noting the substantial benefits LAs can bring to 
participants). 
7. See Lok Adalats For Disposal of Accident Cases, THE STATESMAN (Nov. 28, 2010), 
http://www.thestatesman.net/index.php? option=com_content& view=article&id=
 350166:lok-adalats-for-disposal-of-accident-cases&catid=72:bengal-plus&from_
page=search (reporting the scheduling of two LAs in order to address accident claims); 
see also Sarabjit Jagirdar, Supreme Court Judge Kabir Attends Legal Awareness, Inter 
Departmental Conference in Mizoram, HINDUSTAN TIMES, June 16, 2010, available at 
ProQuest, Doc. No. 2059220371 (reporting that the justices of the Supreme Court of 
India continue to publicly support LAs). 
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The LA system is widespread and has the potential to settle 
many more millions of disputes. 8  As a means for dispute 
resolution, this system has the potential to relieve the over-
burdened dockets of more formal courts.9 LAs also provide 
people with opportunities for justice that they might not 
otherwise have in the formal court system.10 
However, Indian citizens have become increasingly 
dissatisfied with LAs.11 LAs were originally established during the 
1970s and 1980s as an informal and collaborative system.12 Over 
the last two decades, however, the system has become more 
adversarial, as judges and lawyers have increasingly been unable 
to work together.13 Currently, the LA system lacks necessary 
resources such as adequate facilities and sufficient personnel.14 
                                                                                                                                     
8.  See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 1, at 109 (noting that “[b]y November 30, 
2001, 110,600 lok adalats had settled 13,141,938 cases”); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 
90 (noting that by the end of 2002, 1.7 million cases were settled in the state of Gujarat 
alone). 
9. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 97 (describing a study by Professor 
Christian Wollschläger of per capita rates of civil cases filed from 1987 to 1996 in thirty-
five jurisdictions globally, which found that India had a per capita annual filing rate of 
just 3.5 filings per 1000, compared to 123 per 1000 in Germany); see also Christian 
Wollschläger, Exploring Global Landscapes of Litigation Rates, 1998 SOZIOLOGIE DES 
RECHTS 582, 588 (noting that his dataset was limited to one state in India because other 
data was not available); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 1, at 99 (noting that 
despite the small number of cases filed per capita, the courts are extremely congested. 
In 2002 there were twenty-three million pending court cases—twenty thousand in the 
Supreme Court, 3.2 million in the High Courts and twenty million in lower or 
subordinate courts). 
10. See BHARGAVA, supra note 4, at 3, 107 (noting that the opportunity for justice 
with the LAs is greater than in the formal justice system); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 
15 (“[T]he alternative disputes [sic] resolution mechanism emerges not only because 
the adversarial dispute resolution mechanisms fail to provide justice to a large number 
of masses but also because the adversarial system is not a proper mechanism for certain 
classes of cases, for which the ADR is the best mode for dispute resolution.”); see also 
supra notes 1, 4 and accompanying text (explaining that there are economic, 
organizational, and procedural barriers to justice). 
11. See infra Part II.A (describing instances in which individuals were disappointed 
with their experience in the LAs). 
12. See KHAN, supra note 1, at 1 (noting the establishment of LAs in the 1980s and 
the goal of amicable settlements by accommodating both parties); see also Galanter & 
Krishnan, supra note 2, at 797–98 (describing from the 1970s onward the drive to create 
LAs and make them a forum for conciliation and informal dispute resolution). 
13. See infra Part I (describing the history of LAs); see also infra Part II.A 
(describing the discontent between judges and lawyers in LAs). 
14. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the lack of funding and 
staff resources currently experienced in the LA system). 
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It is important, therefore, to consider how this ADR system can 
be improved and how it can better achieve its original goals.15 
This Note considers both Indian and international 
traditions in dispute resolution and attempts to formulate 
practical solutions to the problems of LAs. Ultimately, this Note 
concludes that a combination of lessons drawn from India and 
abroad, adapted to Indian customs, can improve LAs. Part I of 
this Note outlines the history of informal dispute resolution in 
India culminating in the creation of the LA system. Part II first 
describes the LA system’s deficiencies, and then explores the 
alternative dispute resolution systems of Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Part III considers how foreign 
lessons can be applied to India, and combines the foreign 
lessons with local lessons in order to formulate viable solutions 
to the problems plaguing the LA system. 
 I. LOK ADALATS THROUGH THE AGES 
Reviewing the history of informal justice in India is essential 
to understanding the current LA system. This Part first looks at 
an influential predecessor to LAs, the ancient rural system of 
justice called Nyaya Panchayats (“NPs”). It then chronicles LAs 
over the past forty years—from their early history to modern 
times. 
A. Nyaya Panchayats 
India has a long tradition of resolving disputes through 
conciliation efforts outside of the formal legal system. 16 
                                                                                                                                     
15. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 400 (noting that the original impetus behind 
experimentation with alternative methods of dispute resolution was to improve access 
to effective justice, reduce court waiting lists, provide necessary protections to the 
public, and increase consumer satisfaction with the justice system); see also id. at 394, 
(quoting N.H. BHAGWATI, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL 
ADVICE IN BOMBAY 1949, at 25–26 (Ministry of Law, Justice & Co. Affairs)) (describing 
the goals of the LA system); BHARGAVA, supra note 4, at 8–9 (noting that the objectives 
of the LA system are to reduce the backlog in the formal courts, to deliver 
instantaneous and fair justice at the grassroots level, to provide local legal awareness 
and literacy, to utilize compromise and conciliation, and to secure substantive social 
justice). 
16. See KHAN, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that even in ancient times the formal 
system was not considered when resolving disputes); see also Whitson, supra note 2, at 
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Accordingly, LAs evolved from and were influenced by village-
based courts called NPs.17 From ancient times to the twentieth 
century, NPs resolved disputes through informal tribunals 
headed by village elders.18 This was advantageous because the 
elders intimately knew the disputants, the issues, and the 
traditions of the village.19 A ruling by an elder was considered 
well-informed and highly respected based on the elder’s 
position within the community. 20  In village life, informal 
resolutions like conciliation were emphasized.21  
Popularity and use of the NPs declined as the British system 
of justice was established beginning in the mid-1800s.22 However, 
after India’s independence in 1947, members of the ruling 
party, the Indian National Congress, sought to replace the 
formal British adversarial system with a structure that promoted 
                                                                                                                                     
398 (contrasting the values of compromise and context in the NPs to the formalistic 
British system in India at the time). 
17. See KHAN, supra note 1, at 10 (noting the influence of NPs on LAs); see also 
Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 1, at 105 (describing how the legacy of the NPs was 
instrumental in the creation of LAs). 
18. See KHAN, supra note 1, at 6 (describing how the NPs were led by village elders 
who were either elected or had inherited the position); see also Catherine S. Meschievitz 
& Marc Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The Politics of a Moribund Institution, in 2 
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 48–49 (Richard L. Abel ed., 
1982) (describing the status of traditional village leaders who together formed the 
panchayats). 
19. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 398, 421 (noting that deciding cases in the 
context of the dispute is the panchayat tradition); see also Meschievitz & Galanter, supra 
note 18, at 56–57 (describing how the knowledge, experience, and skill of village elders 
could be channeled into NPs). 
20. See, e.g., Whitson, supra note 2, at 398, 421 (stating not only the success of the 
NP practice of deciding cases based on the entire dispute, but also that LAs can be 
effective in facilitating negotiations between conflicting groups only if they include 
extensive involvement from judges or other respected community leaders); see also 
KHAN, supra note 1, at 7 (noting how people were satisfied with decisions made by NPs, 
which included respected village elders, in the pre-British era). 
21. See R.S. Khare, Indigenous Culture and Lawyer’s Law in India, 14 COMP. STUD. 
SOC’Y & HIST. 71, 80 (1972) (noting how village culture finds informal, out-of-court 
conciliations socially and morally desirable as compared to adversarial processes); see 
also Whitson, supra note 2, at 398 (noting that the village populations prefer informal 
settlements to court proceedings). 
22. See KHAN, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that once the British began to fully 
establish their formal court system, the NPs declined); see also Meschievitz & Galanter, 
supra note 18, at 49 (describing how the NPs lost authority as the British system was 
established). 
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harmony and reconciliation. 23  They wanted formal courts 
replaced by the traditional NPs, which had been providing 
justice for hundreds of years.24 Despite this support, lawyers, 
judges, and notably the Chair of the Constitution’s drafting 
committee strongly opposed institutionalizing informal court 
systems.25 Consequently, although NPs were included in the new 
constitution, they were not given much power and quickly 
became defunct.26 
NPs, as envisioned by the new constitution, differed from 
their older and more traditional predecessors. 27  This new 
iteration of NPs brought unwanted formalism to the system, 
such as requiring that certain cases be heard only in the NPs, 
whereas before people had the option of going to the formal 
court system.28 During this time, the NPs quickly receded in use 
                                                                                                                                     
23. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 793–94 (describing the desire to 
bring back the successful parts of the NPs while assimilating it into a more modern 
movement); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 9–10 (describing the desire to make legal 
relief easily accessible to all). 
24. See INDIA CONST. art. 40 (creating a constitutional directive providing for the 
re-establishment of an NP system); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 792–93 
(explaining that Ghandians, those whose political ideology is based on the ideals of 
truth and justice espoused by Mahatma Ghandi, and socialists in the Indian National 
Congress called for traditional NPs to replace the modern court system as a part of 
their vision for a reconstructed India). 
25. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 791 (“[A] proposal that met with the 
nearly unanimous disdain of lawyers and judges and the vitriolic scorn of Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar, chair of the Constitution’s Drafting Committee, who sidetracked the push 
for panchayats into a [non-mandatory goal of the Indian Government].”); see also Marc 
Galanter, The Aborted Restoration of ‘Indigenous’ Law in India, in 14 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & 
HIST. 53, 56–57 (1972) (describing the directive to officially establish the village NPs 
and the drive to de-legitimize it). 
26. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 792 (“[NPs] were established with 
jurisdiction over specific categories of petty cases.”); see also Meschievitz & Galanter, 
supra note 18, at 57 (describing the limited types of claims over which NPs have civil 
jurisdiction). 
27. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 792 (describing the differences 
between the new NPs and the older less formal ones); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 5–
9, 29 (describing the differences between the newer and older NPs). 
28. See, e.g., Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 792 (describing how the new 
NPs made decisions based on statutory law, rather than using indigenous norms); see 
also KHAN, supra note 1, at 5–10, 29 (describing the procedure and formal nature of the 
NPs). The new NPs made decisions based on majority rule rather than unanimity, their 
membership no longer consisted of the leading men of a caste, but rather members 
were to be elected from territorial constituencies. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 
2, at 792. 
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and popularity.29 Caseloads of the NPs declined steadily while 
those of the formal courts continued to rise.30 As legal scholars 
Marc Galanter and Jayanth Krishnan explain, “[I]n little more 
than a decade, nyaya panchayats were moribund . . . . They 
represented an unappetizing combination of the formality of 
official law with the political malleability of village tribunals.”31 
Although the NPs did not follow any formal procedural rules, 
participants still perceived them as a formal system due to their 
explicit recognition in the Indian Constitution.32 
Despite their lack of success, legal intellectuals still 
perceived the NPs as being rich with powerful historical and 
cultural traditions.33 The idea of an informal court system was 
especially attractive to academics because of their interest in 
providing widespread access to the justice system, but their focus 
shifted from promoting an informal court system based on 
village traditions and spirituality, to promoting established law 
based on written legal authority.34  
                                                                                                                                     
29. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 791 (noting that, compared to “their 
traditional counterparts, these official [NPs] encountered severe problems of 
establishing their independence of personal ties with the parties, enforcing their 
decrees, and acting expeditiously”); see also Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 18, at 62 
(providing statistics on the decreasing workload of NPs in the Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh between 1950 and 1972). 
30. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 792 (citing Upendra Baxi & Marc 
Galanter, Panchayat Justice: An Indian Experiment in Legal Access, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE: 
EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 369, tbl.1 (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 
1978)) (“In Uttar Pradesh, civil filings in the NPs fell from 82,321 in 1960 to 22,912 in 
1970. This averages to just over four cases per NP. During the same period, civil filings 
in the Subordinate Courts rose from 74,958 to 86,759.”). 
31 . Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 793 (explaining problems that 
ultimately led to the downfall of the NPs). 
32. See Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 18, at 64 (“[T]he [NP] is thus a body of 
men . . . that handles disputes without regard to applicable rules and yet appears to 
villagers as formal and incomprehensible.”); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, 
at 792 (“We believe that [the decline in NPs] was most likely because they represented 
an unappetizing combination of the formality of official law with the political 
malleability of village tribunals.”). 
33. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 793 (noting how the idea of NPs, 
despite their many shortcomings, is still revered); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 10 
(noting how even in the creation of LAs, policy makers were considering what was 
successful about the NPs); see also Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 18, at 56–57 
(noting the power of the NP legacy). 
34. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 793–94 (noting a report by the 
Expert Committee on Legal Aid, chaired by a Justice of the Indian Supreme Court, 
Krishna Iyer, that highly regards the NPs but recognizes legal justice as coming from 
the “law of the land” and promoting established notions of law). 
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B. Early History of Lok Adalats 
The early history of LAs can be defined by the struggle to 
provide legal aid in India.35 This movement was spurred by the 
concerns of legal scholars and the judiciary who believed that 
the general population would not have adequate legal 
representation without access to free legal services.36 
Former Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court N.H. 
Bhagwati led the first formal and comprehensive inquiry into 
this dilemma.37 In 1949, Bhagwati’s Committee on Legal Aid and 
Legal Advice concluded that legal aid was a “governmental 
responsibility” and that equal protection of the laws placed a 
duty on the government to provide free legal aid as per Article 
14 of the Indian Constitution.38 In the three decades after the 
report’s release, many more committees and official government 
reports studied the need for legal aid.39 
                                                                                                                                     
35. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 392–93 (“The history and development of the 
crusade to provide legal aid in India explain[s] the particular development, goals, and 
purposes of the L.A. courts.”); see also BHARGAVA, supra note 4, at 7 (describing the LA 
system as an integral part of the access to justice movement in India). 
36. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 392–93 (describing the concern about the lack of 
legal defense for those charged with criminal offenses); see also Galanter & Krishnan, 
supra note 1, at 106–07 (noting how legal-aid programs could promote the interests of 
various constituencies). 
37. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 393 (quoting N.H. BHAGWATI, REPORT BY THE 
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL ADVICE IN BOMBAY 10 (1949) (Ministry of Law, 
Justice & Co. Affairs)) (concluding that access to justice for most Indians is impossible 
without a legal-aid scheme). See generally INDIA CONST. art. 39A, amended by The 
Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976 (“The State shall secure that the 
operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and 
shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any 
other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any 
citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.”). 
38. Whitson, supra note 2, at 393 (quoting N.H. BHAGWATI, REPORT BY THE 
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL ADVICE IN BOMBAY 10 (1949) (Ministry of Law, 
Justice & Co. Affairs)) (explaining that Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 
providing for equal protection of the laws, includes the right for all citizens to have 
equal access to the justice system); see also INDIA CONST. art. 14, amended by The 
Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976. 
39. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 393–99 (noting the numerous reports that were 
released regarding access to legal aid). In 1958, the Law Commission of India 
presented a report entitled Reform of Judicial Administration. Id. at 393. In 1959, the 
International Commission of Jurists recognized the need for government-provided free 
legal aid. Id. In 1962, the Committee on Legal Aid at the Third All-India Law 
Conference outlined a comprehensive nationwide plan for free legal aid. Id. at 393–94. 
The National Conference on Legal Aid in 1970 sought to make provisions of legal aid a 
statutory requirement. Id. at 394. The first major state commission to provide legal aid 
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The Bhagwati Report of 1976 (officially titled The Report 
on National Juridicare) was the one of the most important 
instances in which a group of individuals envisioned a court 
system in the image of LAs.40 The State of Gujarat was the first 
major state to acknowledge and establish legal aid because it 
commissioned the Bhagwati Report of 1976, written by a group 
of jurists including former Supreme Court Justice 
Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati. 41  The Bhagwati Report 
argued that poverty was intimately related to the lack of legal 
assistance and access to courts.42 One way to improve socio-
economic conditions through the law, the Report argued, was 
through public-interest litigation that promoted certain rights.43 
Advocates of using public-interest litigation in this way argue 
that the legal system should be a mechanism for providing social 
                                                                                                                                     
was in Gujarat and led by Justice P.N. Bhagwati. Id. The report produced by this 
commission, referred to later as the Bhagwati Report, was the most influential writing 
in articulating an “ideological framework in support of legal aid.” Id. In 1976, the 
Government of India appointed a committee to study the implementation of legal aid. 
Id. at 395. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 793–95 (describing the progression 
of support for free legal aid). 
40. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 794 (quoting P.N. BHAGWATI, 
REPORT ON NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE 33–34 (1976) 
(Ministry of Law, Justice & Co. Affairs, 1976)) (noting how the court system, if used 
correctly, can improve the lives of the populace and provide social justice); see also N.R. 
Madhava Menon, Legal Aid and Justice for the Poor, in LAW AND POVERTY: CRITICAL 
ESSAYS 352–53 (Upendra Baxi ed., 1988) (describing the language of the report); see 
also Whitson, supra note 2, at 394–95 (suggesting the importance of the Bhagwati 
Report). 
41. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 394–95 (describing the implementation of legal 
aid in Gujarat, as well as the impact and importance of the Bhagwati Report); see also 
Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 793–94 (explaining the Bhagwati Report in 
relation to the struggle for legal aid); supra note 39 (detailing the commissioning and 
production of the Bhagwati Report) 
42. See Menon, supra note 40, at 352–53 (quoting P.N. BHAGWATI, REPORT ON 
NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE 25–26 (1976) (Ministry of Law, 
Justice & Co. Affairs, 1976)) (describing the relationship between poverty and the legal 
system and how an increase in free access to the justice system can eradicate poverty). 
43. See Menon, supra note 40, at 352–53 (quoting P.N. BHAGWATI, REPORT ON 
NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE 25–26 (1976) (Ministry of Law, 
Justice & Co. Affairs, 1976)); see, e.g., Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 795–97 
(describing public interest litigation in India beginning in the early 1980s); Whitson, 
supra note 2, at 400 (“The state could realize the social and economic equality 
envisioned in the Constitution by promoting both legal aid and strategic public interest 
litigation . . . .”). 
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justice.44 Advocates also argue that the judiciary should play an 
active role in expanding the legal system.45  
After the Bhagwati Committee report, the Government of 
India commissioned a report on legal services.46 This report was 
the first to explicitly mention conciliation and informal dispute 
resolution as a factor in a national legal aid scheme.47 The 
Report even invoked NPs as a way to provide dispute resolution 
and promote conciliation.48 
Upendra Baxi, a prominent Indian legal scholar and 
researcher, was one player in promoting LAs.49 She documented 
a guru’s50 private experiment with informal dispute resolution in 
the northern Indian village of Rangpur.51 The founder of the 
ashram, Harivallabh Parikh, heard mainly intra-village disputes 
                                                                                                                                     
44. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 794 (quoting P.N. BHAGWATI, 
REPORT ON NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE 33–34 (1976) 
(Ministry of Law, Justice & Co. Affairs, 1976)). See generally S. MURALIDHAR, LAW, 
POVERTY AND LEGAL AID: ACCESS TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2004) (discussing how the legal 
system can be a tool to fight discrimination). 
45. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 794 (quoting P.N. BHAGWATI, 
REPORT ON NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE 33–34 (1976) 
(Ministry of Law, Justice & Co. Affairs, 1976)); see also MURALIDHAR, supra note 44, at 3–
4 (noting how important the judiciary is in expanding the legal system to important 
areas like prisoner rights). 
46. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 793–94 (quoting MINISTRY OF LAW, 
JUSTICE & CO. AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID: PROCESSUAL 
JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE 4 (1974)) (stating that informal justice systems are 
instrumental in improving legal aid and access to justice). 
47. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 395 (quoting MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE & CO. 
AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID: PROCESSUAL JUSTICE TO 
THE PEOPLE 17 (1974)) (noting that conciliation and dispute resolution outside of the 
formal legal system was an essential part of national legal aid in India). 
48. See id. (quoting MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE & CO. AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE 
EXPERT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID: PROCESSUAL JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE 1974, at 39–
58). 
49. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 794 (describing Baxi’s scholarship 
and its importance in publicizing the successes of an LA system); see also Whitson, supra 
note 2, at 405 n.54 (speaking about the influence of Upendra Baxi’s work highlighting 
the advantages of an LA in Rangpur). 
50. A guru is a leader of a spiritual monastery. E.g., Guru, Mirriam-Webster.com, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/guru (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) 
(defining guru as “a personal religious teacher and spiritual guide in Hinduism”).  
51. See generally, Upendra Baxi, From Takrar to Karar: The Lok Adalat at Rangpur—
A Preliminary Study, 10 J. CONST. & PARLIAMENTARY STUD. 52(1976). Rangpur is a village 
in the state of Gujarat in the northwest of India. See id. at 94. 
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where he and representatives of the disputants rendered a 
decision subject to the approval of the local assembly.52 
News of the success of the ashram in Rangpur spread 
quickly and was a model for the first state-backed LA 
experiment, which took place in Gujarat.53 In response to the 
influence of the Bhagwati Report and Upendra Baxi’s study of 
the ashram in Rangpur, both of which had been released in the 
same year and about the same state in India, Gujarat began 
holding LAs in conjunction with legal aid conferences.54 As news 
of the success of Gujarat LAs spread, other states began 
following its example.55 Between 1986 and 1988, LAs were highly 
promoted by politicians, government officials, and the 
judiciary. 56  LAs were created with greater frequency and 
hundreds of thousands of cases were settled.57 
At this point, LAs were at the height of their popularity and 
effectiveness as evidenced by this description: 
When a particular matter is called up for hearing, either the 
petitioner or the lawyer representing him can explain his 
problem. The case is discussed informally, and the 
mediators can intervene at any point in the proceedings, as 
can the opposite party. Issues are clarified, and it is aimed to 
arrive at a fair settlement. . . . [The judge’s] task is merely to 
clarify the law, and by methods of persuasion, make each 
party realise how he stands to benefit from a particular 
                                                                                                                                     
52. Id. at 56–58. 
53. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 405–06 (explaining how quickly LAs became 
popular after Upendra Baxi’s article was published); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra 
note 2, at 794–95 (describing the aftermath of Baxi’s scholarship on LAs in Rangpur). 
54. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 407–09 (noting that Legal Aid conferences had 
been happening during the weekend in India for a little while. They provided basic 
legal services to the public. Thus, even at this point, LAs were intimately connected to 
the legal aid movement); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 29 (describing how the first 
well-known LAs were in the state of Gujarat). 
55. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 406 (describing that once other states heard of 
Gujarat’s success, they began holding their own LAs); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 29 
(describing how the LA in Gujarat was the impetus for growth in the LA system). 
56. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 407–10 (describing how prevalent LAs became 
throughout India from 1986 to 1988); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 64–67 (chronicling 
the many different roles the judiciary played in promoting LAs). 
57. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 409–10 (noting that one report said 1500 LAs had 
been held nationally and over 860,000 cases were settled by August 1987 in these 
bodies); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 799, 802 (noting that one report 
stated by the end of 1997, 349,710 motor vehicle accident claims alone had been 
resolved by LAs but also noting that LAs are usually conducted intermittently). 
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settlement arrived at. . . . On some occasions, the 
compensation amount is made available to the parties on 
the same day, thereby making the lok adalats popular.58 
During this period, LAs were conducted in an informal 
manner as compared to the formal court system.59 LAs could 
hear any type of case because there were no jurisdictional 
limitations.60 They addressed, inter alia, civil matters, minor 
criminal cases, and motor vehicle accident cases.61 Disputes were 
resolved with speed and ease.62 
C. Legitimization and Modern Times 
The Government passed the National Legal Services 
Authorities Act in 1987. 63  The Act affected LAs in three 
important ways. 
First, it conferred statutory authority to LAs.64 It allowed the 
states to organize LAs as they saw fit.65 It also gave LAs the 
jurisdiction to: 
[D]etermine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement 
between the parties to a dispute in the respect of (i) any 
pending case; or (ii) any matter which is falling within the 
                                                                                                                                     
58. Shiraz Sidhva, Lok Adalats: Quick, Informal ‘Nyaya,’ LEX ET JURIS, Dec. 1986, at 
38, 40–41. 
59. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 412 (describing how the lack of rules for LAs 
during this period made them very informal); c.f. KHAN, supra note 1, at 31 (noting 
how LAs were conducted after more formal rules were enacted in later years). 
60. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 412 (noting the lack of jurisdictional or subject 
matter restrictions in LAs initially); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 47–48 (describing the 
structural development of LAs under the statutory backing of the Legal Services 
Authority Act). 
61. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 412 (stating the different types of cases that LAs 
heard); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 800 (noting LAs generally heard 
cases involving the poor, which included family matters, auto accidents, and ordinance 
violations). 
62. Whitson, supra note 2, at 412 (noting how quickly an injured party could 
collect their compensation claim); see also Sidhva, supra note 58, at 38 (noting the 
positive perception of LAs at the time). 
63. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1987 
(India). 
64. See id. § 20 ( providing methods by which cases in the formal court system 
could move in LAs). 
65. See id. § 19 (giving each State Authority the discretion to organize LAs). 
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jurisdiction of, and is not brought before, any court for 
which the Lok Adalat is organized.66  
Second, it permitted pending cases in the formal courts to 
be transferred to LAs by direct application of one or both 
parties.67 If conciliation was not achieved, then the case could 
move back to the formal court from which it came.68 
Third, the Act made awards given out by LAs enforceable.69 
Any awards issued were considered equivalent to decrees of a 
civil court. 70  Also significant was that the award issued was 
binding on both the parties and could not be appealed.71 
Despite the demand for legislation on LAs, however, there 
was strong opposition to the Legal Services Act.72 Critics of the 
Legal Services Act thought it defeated the informal and grass-
roots nature of LAs, which resulted from the popular desire to 
settle disputes through conciliation.73 Former Supreme Court 
Justice Krishna Iyer, a prominent Indian jurist who was 
instrumental in the LA movement, was disappointed with the 
Act’s insistence that judicial officers and lawyers have ultimate 
responsibility for LA courts, and that decisions in those courts 
be made according to common law principles.74 
In 1999, the Indian government further legitimized LAs by 
adding Section 89 to the Civil Procedure Code of India.75 
                                                                                                                                     
66. Id. § 20. 
67. See id. § 20 (allowing any party to apply to the presiding court to transfer the 
case to a LA). 
68. See id. § 20 (stating that once a case is referred to a LA and no award is made 
because there was no compromise or settlement, the case returns to the presiding 
court). 
69. Id. § 21. 
70. Id.  
71. Id. 
72. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 415–16 (noting that critics of the Legal Services 
Act felt that it detracted from the informality of the LAs); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 
48 (“[T]here is apprehension about the losing of [the] basic characteristic[s] of Lok-
Adalat itself.”). 
73. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 415 (noting that the Legal Services Act “defeated 
the spirit and purpose of the [LA] courts as informal, grass-roots courts that existed 
almost apart from state authority, and pointed out that [LA] courts had evolved 
naturally as a result of popular desire to resolve disputes through conciliation, without 
intervention of official courts.”). 
74 . See id. (quoting V.R. KRISHNA IYER, LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY ACT: A 
CRITIQUE 47 (1988)) (stating that the Legal Services Act made LAs no longer focused 
on social mobilization and speedy justice). 
75. Sec. 89, No. 46 of 1908, CODE OF CIV. PROC. (1999) (India). 
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Section 89 allows a court, when it appears that there is the 
possibility of a settlement, to formulate the terms and submit 
them to the parties for their comments.76 Most importantly, on 
receiving a response from the parties, the court may formulate a 
settlement and refer the case to ADR, including LAs.77 
In 2002, there was an amendment to the Legal Services 
Authority Act that specifically affects LAs.78 This amendment 
established permanent LAs for specific types of disputes.79 For 
example, LAs were set up to resolve disputes concerning public 
utilities services. 80  This is an important transition because, 
previously, if two parties could not come to a resolution they 
would go back into the formal justice system.81 This was seen as a 
delay in the dispensation of justice and was used to that end by 
many lawyers.82 However, with permanent LAs, judges have the 
authority to make decisions based on the merits, as well as to 
compel conciliation.83 
Today, although procedures of LAs vary by region in India, 
there are many overarching similarities.84 Most LAs take place 
during the weekends, usually a Saturday, in a government 
                                                                                                                                     
76. See id. (allowing courts to create the terms of the settlement and give them to 
the parties for approval). 
77. See id. (giving the court the power to reformulate a settlement or send the case 
to alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) after the parties have reviewed the initial 
settlement suggestion by the court). 
78. The Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 
2002 (India). 
79. Id. § 22B. 
80. See id. (creating the permanent LAs for disputes over public utilities services). 
81. See KHAN, supra note 1, at 55–56 (noting the power LAs had to make decisions 
after the 2002 amendment); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 811–12 
(showing, through description of the permanent LAs, the more formal nature of LAs 
post-2002); Sec. 89, No. 46 of 1908, CODE OF CIV. PROC. (1999) (India) (noting the 
ability to go back into the formal justice system if there was no resolution). 
82. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 818–19 (describing different ways in 
which lawyers “have begun to engage ‘quietly’ in tactics that they hope will eventually 
undermine the Lok Adalat process”). 
83. The Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act § 22C (noting that even if 
the parties cannot come to an agreement, permanent LAs can make a decision on the 
case); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 831 (noting the 2002 amendment 
and the power it gives to the permanent LAs). 
84. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 810–11 (accounting different 
anecdotes from interviews conducted at LAs); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 119–121 
(describing many of the procedural and other similarities of LAs before summarizing 
the state-by-state statistics); BHARGAVA, supra note 4, at 51 (breaking up all statistics into 
different states in India). 
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building.85 Unfortunately, lines are usually long, resources are 
inadequate, and the presence of lawyers is inconsistent.86 The 
panels are normally chaired by a High Court or District Court 
judge from that jurisdiction.87 The Legal Services Authority Act 
requires that judicial panels have at least three people. 88 
Adherence to these rules, however, varies.89  
Modern LAs can be traced back to the advent of NPs in 
ancient India.90 However, as the justice system and the country 
have evolved, LAs have become a very different mechanism of 
justice than the original NPs.91 
II. THE LOK ADALAT EXPERIENCE COMPARED TO 
MEDIATION INTERNATIONALLY  
In order to ultimately suggest improvements to the LA 
system, Part II considers the current state of the LA and foreign 
mediation systems. Section A examines how the LA system has 
been unsuccessful. Section B describes the most successful 
aspects of mediations systems in Australia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. These countries are all common law 
jurisdictions, like India, and have well-developed mediation 
                                                                                                                                     
85. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 810–11 (describing the general 
procedures and process of the LAs); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 31–32 (describing 
the general composition, organization, and procedure of the LAs). 
86. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 810–11 (“The Electricity, Pension, 
High Court, and General Lok Adalats each had long lines of claimants who often 
waited hours before having their cases heard . . . . The rooms holding the sessions were 
stuffy, crowded, and lacked air conditioning. Claimants typically sat and listened for 
their names to be called by a government-employed Lok Adalat clerk before 
approaching the judicial panel. Standing next to the panel would be a court 
stenographer who, upon direction of the presiding judge, would write down for the 
record what the judge believed to be the pertinent information regarding the case. The 
presence of lawyers representing claimants varied depending on the Lok Adalat. In the 
General, High Court, and Women’s Lok Adalats most claimants came accompanied by 
lawyers.”). 
87. See id. (describing the composition of the panel of judges); see also KHAN, supra 
note 1, at 31–32 (describing the general composition of the panel of judges and noting 
the differences between states). 
88. The Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act § 19. 
89. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 810–11 (describing LA’s reluctance 
to follow the rules of who can be on a judicial panel). 
90. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting the link between NPs and 
LAs). 
91. See supra Part I (showing the development and growth of LAs into the modern 
LA system). 
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schemes in place.92 As a result, a comparative study among these 
countries is particularly instructive. 
A. Problems with Lok Adalats 
Even though LAs continue to be accepted today, they have 
not met many of their initial goals.93 The decline of LAs started 
in the late 1980s.94 For example, the state of Rajasthan, a leader 
in the LA movement, only reported holding seven sessions in 
1987, compared to a peak of 154 sessions the year before.95 
The LA system evolved to encompass characteristics of both 
the informal and formal justice systems. Initially, people 
supported the LA system because of popular dissatisfaction with 
the time and cost of litigation in the formal court system.96 
Participants approved of LAs because they provided quick 
resolutions and a sense of collaboration.97 However, over time, 
fewer LAs were held because of a severe lack of resources, which 
prevented adequate administration of LAs despite their growing 
demand.98 Once legislation was passed to provide additional 
resources, such as conferring greater power to LAs and allowing 
for more referrals to the LA system, the very reasons that initially 
attracted people to the system, dissipated as LAs were 
                                                                                                                                     
92. See infra Part II.B (describing different common law countries with well-
developed ADR systems). 
93. See supra notes 8, 15 and accompanying text (explaining the initial popularity 
of the LAs and the goals of LAs when they were first established); see also Whitson, supra 
note 2, at 391 (describing the shortcomings of LAs compared to their initial goals). 
94. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 416 (using numbers on LAs in the state of 
Rajasthan to show a decrease in LAs held starting in 1987). Cf. Galanter & Krishnan, 
supra note 2, at 799, 825 (providing data that shows an increase in LAs held between 
1991 and 2001, after which their numbers decreased); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 
69–76 (showing LA data from various regions confirming a decrease in number of LAs 
held after 2001) 
95. Whitson, supra note 2, at 416 (noting the decline in the number of LAs held 
in Rajasthan, despite official reports). 
96. See id. (describing the consensus among interviewees that using the formal 
courts was a burden); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 14–16 (noting the need for a non-
adjudicative process). 
97. Whitson, supra note 2, at 419 (recounting responses in interviews conducted 
at LAs). 
98. See id. (“In an interview, the Chairman of the State Legal Aid Board, Mr. 
Nathawat, explained that part of the reason for the decline was a critical shortage of 
staff.”); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 810–11 (noting the lack of 
resources and general poor condition of the LAs). 
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increasingly viewed as just another arm of the formal justice 
system. 99  As a result, not only have people had negative 
experiences with LAs, but the LA system has struggled to 
provide justice to the public in five ways.  
First, disputants have provided numerous examples of 
dissatisfaction with LAs as a result of the conduct of judges and 
lawyers.100 Legal scholars Marc Galanter and Jayanth Krishnan, 
who conducted a series of interviews on LAs, found that the 
forum no longer provides the swift and fair justice upon which 
people had come to rely.101 Some of the issues that affected 
disputants include: poor relationship between judges and 
lawyers, unpreparedness, and pressure to settle.102 
Further, judges may be hostile toward the presence of 
lawyers in these forums because they may negatively impact 
settlement agreements.103 According to one judge interviewed by 
Galanter and Krishnan, “lawyers are famous . . . for dragging 
on cases.”104 Such a strained relationship can lead to undesirable 
outcomes.105 In one situation, Galanter and Krishnan observed a 
well-prepared lawyer representing a set of grandparents seeking 
to obtain custody rights over their grandson.106 When the lawyer 
attempted to present his clients’ case, however, the judge 
                                                                                                                                     
99. See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text (explaining that legislation such 
as the Legal Services Authority Act of 1987 provided the LAs with greater jurisdiction, 
greater power, and greater abilities of referral); see also Whitson, supra note 2, at 433 
(“[LAs] thus serve as conduits for the extension of rules which are often very foreign to 
local ways and customs.”). 
100. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 813–15, 820 (listing examples of 
disputant dissatisfaction gathered from hundreds of interviews with all parties involved 
in LAs). 
101. See id. at 791 (“[T]he claim that this forum offers participants speedy, fair, 
and deliberative justice needs serious reconsideration.”). 
102. See id. at 811–12 (summing up the problems through examples of the 
electricity and pension LAs). 
103. See id. at 811–12, 815 (noting that at least one judge disapproves of the 
presence of lawyers in LAs where claims are initiated by current civil service workers 
who are disputing their pension or compensation); see also BHARGAVA, supra note 4, at 
114 (noting that some participants even think it is inappropriate to have a lawyer 
present). 
104. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 811 (relaying an interview with the 
presiding judge of a pension LA). The authors also note that on the day they observed 
proceedings, a lawyer was present in only three out of twenty-three cases. See id. at 811. 
105. See id. at 815–16 (noting the tension between lawyers and judges). 
106. Id. at 814–16 (describing an encounter the authors observed at a general 
LA). 
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immediately interrupted him and then continued to be hostile 
toward the lawyer for the rest of the proceeding.107 
In many instances, judges and lawyers do not work together 
to facilitate settlements in the best interest of their clients, 
resulting in unfair outcomes for disputants. 108  In one case 
observed by Galanter and Krishnan, a bus driver allegedly 
caused an accident harming many people.109 The judge and 
both attorneys only spent between fifteen seconds to two 
minutes to resolve each injured person’s case.110 The judge 
would look at the x-rays himself and make a decision based on 
his own judgment.111 Lawyers say that judges infrequently review 
important evidence and hand down unsupported decisions.112 
Further, disputants are frequently dissatisfied because one 
party’s attorney is unprepared or not present, which 
subsequently prohibits the parties from being able to reach a 
settlement.113 Galanter and Krishnan observed that often the 
government is absent or must ask for a postponement because 
they are unprepared.114 A judge often must reluctantly grant the 
motion to postpone.115 
Additionally, LA judges are pressured to improperly force 
reconciliation on parties out of a desire to achieve high 
                                                                                                                                     
107. Id. at 815–16. 
108. Id. (noting a custody dispute in which the judge and lawyers were at odds). 
109 . Id. at 815 (“[A] case involving twenty-six claimants who were seeking 
compensation from a state-owned bus company for injuries they sustained during a 
violent traffic accident.”). 
110. Id. (“[E]ach individual case took anywhere between 15 seconds to two 
minutes to resolve.”). 
111. Id. at 816 (“[T]he chief district judge held each x-ray up to the light and 
attempted to decipher the seriousness of the injuries. When Krishnan asked if he had 
medical training to read the x-rays, the judge noted that since he had been involved in 
many of these types of cases in the past, he had developed a ‘knack’ for this skill.”). 
112. Id. at 818 (noting that lawyers have commented that “judges refused to take 
the time to study what often were complex issues, examining, for example, important 
evidence in a very cursory manner or simply not at all.”). 
113. See id. at 812 (observing that in the electricity and pension LAs, the 
government agencies are notorious for upsetting judges and disputants for lack of 
preparedness); but see BHARGAVA, supra note 4, at 91 (observing that people generally 
think there is a possibility of a quick decision). 
114. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 812 (noting that the government 
was not ready in over half of the observed electricity LA cases). 
115. See id. at 819 (“Yet without the lawyers present . . . the panel and the parties 
are reluctant to finalize a settlement . . . .”). 
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settlement rates.116 There is perceived political power in positive 
statistics and, therefore, members of LA systems strive for high 
settlement numbers.117 Galanter and Krishnan observed that this 
may lead to cases being sent to LAs even though they should be 
tried in a formal court.118 In a typical example, a judge, instead 
of issuing a ruling, ordered parties to reach an agreement by 
themselves.119 
Aside from the issues caused by people’s experiences with 
judges and lawyers, a second issue is the adversarial nature of 
LAs.120 Rural villagers prefer settlement through an informal 
medium.121 To most, it is socially and morally desirable to reach 
a compromise outside of court, created in an informal 
atmosphere where there is no winner or loser.122 Consequently, 
the adversarial process is considered too formal and is therefore 
used as a last resort.123 However, when LAs incorporate parts of 
the formal justice system, as legislation like the Legal Services 
Authorization Acts sought to do, parties make poorly-informed 
decisions because of their preference for conciliation.124 Just 
                                                                                                                                     
116. Id. at 807 (noting the pressure to settle cases); see also Whitson, supra note 2, 
at 440 (commenting on how certain situations call for decisions by formal courts). 
117. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 807, 820 (noting how politicians 
think it advantageous have the highest amounts of settlements in LAs in their district); 
see also Whitson, supra note 2, at 440 (noting how success is measured on the number of 
settlements and not on the impact on the community or achievement of substantive 
goals). 
118 . See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 813–16 (describing several 
examples of judges forcing settlement upon parties). 
119. See id. at 814 (providing an example of a LA-mandated reconciliation 
between parties outside of the justice system). 
120. See infra notes 121–125 and accompanying text (describing how LAs were 
meant to be a process of conciliation and settlement, which is more suitable for the 
rural population when compared to the adversarial process). 
121. See Khare, supra note 21, at 78–79 (describing the cultural significance of 
conciliation over adversarial processes); see also Whitson, supra note 2, at 398 (finding 
that the village population finds settlement socially and morally preferable to 
resolutions by the adversarial system). 
122. See Khare, supra note 21, at 78–79 (describing how conciliation is associated 
with patience and legal fighting is shortsighted); see also Whitson, supra note 2, at 398 
(noting that compromise is considered more efficient and fair). 
123. See Khare, supra note 21, at 85 (noting how it is considered culturally 
unnatural to go to a lawyer); see also Whitson, supra note 2, at 398 (echoing the idea 
that going to a lawyer is an unfavorable action). 
124. Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical 
Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 424 (2010) (explaining that data shows parties 
need the proper type of forum and information in order to make fully informed 
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after India’s independence, the promotion of the formal legal 
system over the values, traditions, and methods associated with 
the dispute resolution systems of rural and native populations 
was a major obstacle in the country’s ability to promote the 
guarantees of the new constitution.125 
The third reason the LA system has failed to provide justice 
to the public is that, of the LA mediations that did succeed, such 
success was due to one or two judges who made a special effort 
to completely understand the issue, the parties, and devise a 
proper resolution. 126  In many situations, it was this judicial 
dedication that enabled conciliation rather than the informal 
structure of the LAs.127 Consequently, without motivated judges 
and lawyers, conciliation is unlikely.128 
Fourth, in rural LAs, there are numerous unsuccessful 
attempts at conciliations because judges and lawyers fail to 
understand the relationship between disputants.129 Often, the 
parties have a long history of caste or tribal conflict.130 In some 
                                                                                                                                     
decisions regarding disputes); see also Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in 
Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decision-Making, 74 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 775, 778 (1999) (noting the importance of informed decision-making during the 
mediation process). 
125. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 399 (noting noting that the absence of the state 
judicial system in rural areas prevented the Constitution and its protections from 
reaching villagers). 
126. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 821–22 (noting that the few success 
stories Krishnan and Galanter heard involved a judge going above and beyond the 
norm); see also Whitson, supra note 2, at 405 (talking about how Harivallabh Parikh, the 
leader of the original Rangpur LA, and not the LA itself, was probably the reason why 
the LA was so successful); see also Baxi, supra note 51, at 62 (describing Harivallabh as 
the driving factor behind the success of the Rangpur LA). 
127. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 420 (“The ‘conciliation’ seems to have been 
more the result of the dedication and authority of the three judges than of anything 
inherently unique in the structure of [LA] courts.”). 
128. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 21 (“These programs have enjoyed limited 
success as they have been dependent on individuals to drive them and frequently do 
not have the resources to promote and support them.”). 
129. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 436 (noting that limited success of LAs can 
partially be explained by the ignorance of the judges to the true nature of the conflict 
between the parties); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 817–19 (describing 
how lawyers and judges think the other actor does not properly understand the issue 
between the parties). 
130. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 436 (explaining that often parties in LAs have a 
long history of conflict stemming from their caste or tribe). 
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examples, the source of issues between parties, even if known, is 
simply ignored when a resolution is suggested.131 
Fifth, even if the parties decide against mediation and go to 
court, they might have to wait up to ten years before their case is 
heard.132 This makes the option of going to court unfeasible and 
causes the LA system to appear as an involuntary process.133 
Due to the forgoing issues, the amount of cases brought 
before LAs and successfully resolved per LA has declined.134 
From 1996 to 2002, there was a steady continuous drop of cases 
resolved per LA.135 
B. Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Law Countries 
Like India, many countries, intending to grant their citizens 
equal access to justice, have developed alternative dispute 
resolution systems.136 Nations such as Australia, Canada, the 
                                                                                                                                     
131 . See JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES 18 (1995) (explaining that understanding each 
party and the conflict between parties is crucial when trying to come to a settlement or 
a conciliation); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 818 (noting the sentiment 
of several lawyers that judges often fail to look deeply enough into the issues). 
132. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 808, 828–29 (contrasting the 
quickness of a LA decision with bringing the case in regular courts); see also Whitson, 
supra note 2, at 400 (noting how disputants experience frustration with the often 
crowded and slow-moving dockets of the regular courts). 
133. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 828–29 (noting that the problems 
with the regular court system prevent many people from using it); see also Whitson, 
supra note 2, at 400 (noting that the overcrowded nature of the court system causes 
people to lose their sense of control in the process). 
134. See Whitson, supra note 2, at 416, 422 (noting that reports and observations 
show a decline in LAs held starting in 1987); KHAN, supra note 1, at 71 (describing the 
decline of the LAs in the state of Gujarat). 
135. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 2, at 799 (“As of March 1996, some 
13,061 had been organized nationwide and some 5,738,000 cases were resolved there 
(about 440 per [LA]). Twenty-one months later the total had risen to some 17,633 
[LAs] and 6,886,000 cases settled. That means [that] in the twenty-one-month period, 
4,572 [LA]s were held—some 218 per month or 2600 per year and that approximately 
1.148 million cases were resolved (about 251 per [LA]). Unpublished data from the 
National Legal Services Authority shows that as of the end of 1999, 49,415 [LAs] were 
held with 9,720,289 cases being settled (about 197 per [LA]). By November 30, 2001, 
there were 110,600 [LAs] that had settled 13,141,938 cases (about 119 settled per 
[LA]).” (citations omitted)); see also KHAN, supra note 1, at 71 (stating that in Gujarat, 
the number of cases dealt with and disposed of by LAs increased from 1998–2000 and 
then dropped dramatically through 2001 and 2002). 
136. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 5 (describing how ADR processes developed 
in many countries in order to facilitate access to justice). 
2011] IMPROVING THE LOK ADALAT SYSTEM 269 
United Kingdom, and the United States have gone through 
three waves of growth in this “Access to Justice” movement.137 In 
the first wave, starting in the 1960s, these countries developed 
ways to counter economic barriers to justice such as limited 
access to information and representation.138 The start of the 
1970s marked the beginning of the second wave, during which 
time countries fought for collective rights and interests through 
selective class actions.139 Finally, during the third wave in the late 
1970s, countries brought parties access to justice through ADR 
processes.140 One of the ADR processes that developed was a 
community mediation movement. 141  To clarify, community 
mediation occurs at community centers and other forums 
outside of the courtroom, which can then lead to mediation 
systems run by the formal court system.142 
Mediation in the United States is a well-established practice. 
Alongside the wave theory chronicling access to justice discussed 
above, the mediation movement also had three phases. First, 
from the mid 1970s to early 1980s mediation was initially 
promulgated through pilot programs and experimental 
projects.143 The second phase, beginning in the early 1990s, was 
                                                                                                                                     
137.  See id. (describing the wave theory of growth for certain common law 
countries and ADR). See generally Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The 
Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 181 
(1978) (describing the wave theory of growth for the access to justice movement).  
138. Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 137, at 197–98 (explaining the first wave of 
growth in ADR). 
139. Id. at 209–10 (describing the second wave of growth in ADR and the 
timeframe). 
140. Id. at 222–23 (explaining the third wave and its relation to the access to 
justice movement). 
141. Id. at 226 (noting the different types of mediation that are part of the third 
wave); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that community mediation is part 
of the third wave). 
142. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 137, at 226 (describing mediation as a 
part of the third wave); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 11 (describing how 
community mediation movement is the forerunner to court related mediation). 
143. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Evolution of Mediation in the United States: Issues 
Ripe for Regulation May Shape the Future of Practice, in GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION 390 
(Nadja Alexander ed., 2nd ed., 2006) (“From the mid 1970s through to the early 1980s 
mediation was initiated in experimental projects and pilot programs. Most of these 
were community-based, rather than court-annexed, programs. Use of mediation in 
small claims courts, however, was occurring in conjunction with the creation and 
expansion of many community mediation centres.”); see also Timothy Hedeen, 
Institutionalizing Community Mediation: Can Dispute Resolution “of, by, and for the People” 
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characterized by rapid expansion and implementation of court 
and community mediation schemes.144 More recently, the third 
phase has been a period of regulation.145 
Mediation in the United States has been addressed on a 
national level, making it more formal than many other 
mediation systems.146 One example of what makes the mediation 
system more formal is the use of established model rules, such as 
ethical standards for mediators.147 One aspect, confidentiality in 
mediation, is formally addressed in the Uniform Mediation Act 
of 2003.148 Additionally, there are several prominent national 
mediation associations.149 
Today, in the United States, both community and court-
annexed mediation enjoy statutory, academic, and practitioner 
support.150 Empirical studies have shown that time and money 
are saved, settlement is hastened, parties are increasingly 
                                                                                                                                     
Long Endure?, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 265, 267 (2003) (describing how the Pound 
Conference led to establishment of neighborhood justice center pilot programs). 
144 . See Kovach, supra note 143, at 390 (“These programs were generally 
implemented without consideration of the numerous legal, ethical, and practical issues 
that mediation practice is currently facing. Significant variation in development 
existed, dependent in part upon prior experience with mediation, the type of matter 
mediated and how the jurisdiction embraced the process.”). 
145. See id. (“Regulation covers a wide range of issues and includes such matters 
as the management of mediated cases, how the mediation process is conducted, the 
conduct of the participants in mediation and mediator quality control.”). 
146.  See id. at 389–91 (describing how mediation systems in the United States 
have a reputation of sophistication). 
147. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Arbitration 
Ass’n, Am. Bar Ass’n & Ass’n Conflict Resol. 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/
dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007.pdf. 
148. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT §§ 4–6 (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf (setting out confidentiality rules for 
mediation proceedings). 
149 . See, e.g., Section of Dispute Resolution, AM. BAR ASS’N, Sep. 27, 2011, 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/; ASS’N CONFLICT RESOL, Sep. 27, 2011, http://www.
acrnet.org/. 
150. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (2006) (supporting 
community mediation); Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651 
(2006) (supporting court-annexed mediation); see also Dorcas Quek, Mandatory 
Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of Implementing a Court-Mandated 
Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 483 (2010) (noting the 
prevalence and benefits of mandatory mediation); Kovach, supra note 143, at 393 
(referring to both community mediation centers and court annexed mediation 
systems); John T. Blankenship, The Vitality of the Opening Statement in Mediation: A 
Jumping-Off Point to Consider the Process of Mediation, 9 APPALACHIAN J.L. 165, 171 
(describing the rise in popularity of mediation in the US). 
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satisfied and they have continued relationships post-
mediation.151 
In the United States, legal scholars have fostered inquiries 
into heightened cultural sensitivity in the courtroom.152  For 
example, John Paul Lederach, a prominent scholar of conflict 
resolution and mediation, has looked not only at the types of 
interactions different groups have with the government but also 
how the government can best accommodate these differences in 
cultural expectations.153 
Lederach advances four principles.154 First, communities 
should be informed about ADR methods from people that are 
respected in their community.155 Second, there should be a 
conscious acknowledgement, by decision makers, of the 
dominant culture of the courts and justice system.156 In this vein, 
the third principle suggests that culturally relevant information 
about the dispute and the parties should be gathered before 
making a decision.157 Finally, judges should work within the 
disputants’ culture, not the dominant culture, to create a 
socially acceptable solution.158 
In the United Kingdom, the development of ADR has been 
the result of civil justice reforms,159 increased incorporation of 
                                                                                                                                     
151. See Kovach, supra note 143, at 395 (describing results of some empirical 
research on the advantages of mediation). See generally T.J. Stipanowich, ADR and the 
“Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004) (summarizing empirical research on mediation). 
152. See LEDERACH, supra note 131, at 200–01 (analyzing, among other things, 
how important training can be in the cultural aspect of mediation); see also John Paul 
Lederach et al., Fostering Culturally Responsive Courts, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 185, 200–201 
(2001) (considering the best way to be more culturally sensitive to people of different 
ethnicities and traditions). 
153. See Lederach et al., supra note 152, at 185 (examining specifically the impact 
of ADR in Latino populations and how cultural sensitivity by the government can 
substantially improve the experience Latino’s have in the justice system). 
154. Id. at 195–200 (describing the four principles that would improve mediation 
systems). 
155. Id. at 200 (noting that respected members of the Latino community would be 
instrumental in providing information about ADR ). 
156. Id. (noting that the dominant culture is usually the culture most prevalent 
within the court system). 
157. Id. (explaining that culturally relevant information will help to understand 
the nature of the conflict and shape more appropriate rulings). 
158. Id. (explaining that a culturally sensitive solution is more appropriate). 
159. See Harry Woolf, Access to Justice—Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the 
Civil Justice System in England and Wales, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (June 1995), 
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ADR in the formal court system, increased professionalization of 
ADR providers, and an attitudinal shift toward supporting 
ADR. 160  Both court-annexed programs and community 
mediation centers are well-established.161 ADR in the United 
Kingdom has been described as a public-private partnership 
because certain public services are now performed by private 
providers.162 
In Australia, mandatory referral to mediation processes is 
prevalent.163 There is a lack of a clear legislative definition of 
mediation in Australia, which results in the use of different 
definitions in different states and areas of jurisdiction.164 As a 
result, the process and characteristics of mediation resemble the 
most common practices in each jurisdiction.165 Mediation forms 
such as process-oriented mediation, substance-oriented 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interim/contents.htm (reporting, in part, on alternative 
dispute resolution). In the 1990s, Lord Woolf was the impetus for a major push toward 
ADR. See generally id. Reports published by Lord Woolf led to the enactment of the Civil 
Procedure Rules, which required courts to encourage parties to use ADR processes 
when appropriate. See generally Civil Procedure Rules, 1999, S.I. 1998/3132, Part 1.4 
(U.K.) (requiring courts to encourage parties to utilize mediation); Jacqueline Nolan-
Haley, Consent in Mediation, 14 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4, 6 (2008) (describing how Lord 
Woolf was instrumental in developing ADR in England). 
160. See, e.g., ADR GROUP, Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.adrgroup.co.uk (providing 
commercial mediation services and training); CENTRE FOR DISP. RESOL., Sept. 27, 2011, 
http://www/cedr.com (providing commercial mediation services, training, and 
accreditation); see Loukas Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales: A Successful Case of Public 
Private Partnership, in GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION 164, 172 (Nadja Alexander ed., 2d 
ed. 2006) (describing how professionals quickly changed their attitudes toward 
alternative dispute resolution); see also Attitudes to Mediation, at 12, CENTRE FOR DISP. 
RESOL., (June 2001), http://www.cedr.com/library/articles/CEDR_PCB_survey.pdf 
(confirming that Lord Woolf’s reforms were successful in implementing ADR systems 
in England). 
161. See Mistelis, supra note 160, at 177 (concluding that “mediation is here to 
stay”). 
162. Id. at 161 (noting that “a traditionally public service is now offered and 
performed by private providers”). 
163. See Tania Sourdin, Mediation in Australia: Impacts on Litigation, in GLOBAL 
TRENDS IN MEDIATION 37, 39 (Nadja Alexander ed., 2d ed. 2006) (noting that 
Australia’s courts have implemented mandatory referral to mediation for almost two 
decades). 
164. See id. at 40–41 (Noting that it is impossible to define mediation in Australia 
and as a result “[i]n practice, very different forms of mediation processes are used in 
different jurisdictions and subject areas”). 
165. Id. at 41 (noting that “there is a tendency to adopt the process characteristics 
that are most used in practice in that State or jurisdiction”). 
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mediation, transformative mediation, impasse model of 
mediation, and shuttle mediation are all commonly used.166 
The ADR systems in common law jurisdictions have been 
successful.167 Studies conclude that matters are being settled 
earlier and in a more structured way, leading to reduced costs 
and time involved in case management, which has relieved over-
burdened court dockets.168 Additionally, studies have shown that 
both parties and attorneys endorse mediation, found the process 
fair, and would recommend it to others.169 
III. BRINGING PROPER JUSTICE TO ALL 
This Part evaluates lessons learned from dispute resolution 
systems in foreign countries and in India, and then provides 
viable solutions to the current problems facing the LA system. 
This Part considers both structural and cultural improvements 
that can facilitate an effective local mediation scheme in India. 
The LA system is significant, regardless of its declining 
popularity. 170  It has the potential to considerably transform 
India and its legal system by providing millions of people a 
forum for resolving important disputes in meaningful ways.171 
Ideally, more resources could be dedicated to LAs allowing for 
LAs to be held more regularly.172 Culturally, the ideal balance 
                                                                                                                                     
166. See id. at 38–40 (stating that process-oriented mediation is where the parties, 
not the mediator, provide the solution). In substance-oriented mediation, the mediator 
is an authority figure who evaluates the issue based on their experience and offers 
possible resolutions. Id. at 42–43. In a transformative mediation, the mediator’s role is 
to “foster empowerment and recognition of the parties.” Id. at 43. An impasse model is 
used in divorce proceedings when parties reach an impasse; it uses short term 
intervention that incorporates the whole family. Id. The shuttle model is “where the 
mediator shuttles between parties conveying options and ideas.” Id. 
167. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 16–17 (referring to empirical data showing 
the success of ADR in common law jurisdictions). 
168. See id. (noting the numerous ways in which ADR has been successful in 
common law countries, such as Australia, Canada, England, and the United States). 
169. See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We 
Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 690 (aggregating 
empirical data that revealed parties and attorneys support mediation). 
170. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text (describing how powerful LAs 
can be). 
171. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text (describing how many people LAs 
can reach). 
172. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the lack of resources 
available to LAs); see also supra notes 103, 123, 129, 131, 133 and accompanying text 
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between a formal and informal forum would encourage people 
to seek redress from LAs.173 This would fit into and contribute to 
the ongoing effort of bringing social justice to the public.174 LAs 
can defeat many social injustices in the rural culture by 
“indigenizing” some protections of the official judicial system.175 
As such, finding solutions to the current shortcomings of LAs is 
imperative. 
The goal ought to be to strike the proper balance between 
a national vision of rights based on equality and justice and a 
local vision of decentralized judicial administration, local self-
rule, and popular justice free from the artifice and deceit 
associated with formal courts.176 India can do this in many ways. 
First, India should devote a proportionally comparable 
amount of resources to ADR to countries such as Australia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States. 177  There is currently a 
severe lack of resources in the LA system, which can limit the 
number of cases heard and lead to understaffing, inefficient 
dispensation of remedies, and general disorganization.178 An 
influx of staff, funding, and facilities would allow LAs to run 
more effectively, make them structurally sound, and increase 
public confidence in them. Technology could also be utilized in 
all aspects of the process to improve access and efficiency. 
Second, LAs should use Australia as an example and better 
incorporate the characteristics of conciliation specific to each 
locality.179 Indians speak hundreds of languages, and culture and 
                                                                                                                                     
(describing structural flaws of LAs that have caused access to the system to be 
intermittent and difficult for the public). 
173. See supra Part II.A (describing how the conflict between formalism and 
informalism in LAs is one problem plaguing them). 
174. See supra note 136–42 and accompanying text (describing the “Access to 
Justice” movement and wave theory). Although LAs were not considered part of this 
movement initially, providing a forum for dispute resolution is an essential element of 
the first wave. See supra notes 136–42 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (noting the importance of 
indigenizing the LAs). 
176. See supra notes 40, 43–45 and accompanying text (detailing the original lofty 
goals of the LAs). 
177. See supra Part II.B (describing the ADR systems in place in common law 
countries). 
178. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the lack of resources in 
LAs). 
179. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text (describing how ADR in 
Australia is flexible in order to best deal with local cultures and issues). 
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tradition vary widely from village to village. A legal system that 
imposes insensitive rulings by not adjusting to the particularities 
of each region is ineffective. 180  Therefore, LAs should 
incorporate the processes and characteristics of conciliation 
most used in each locality in order to compel parties to use LAs 
so that they have a more positive and permanent effect. 
India should take lessons from the success of its traditional 
NPs.181 Today, LAs rarely consider indigenous practices and 
customs.182 This can seriously inhibit conciliation because the 
resolution is often inappropriate and so the parties do not 
accept it. The NPs were successful in the past because of the 
involvement of the community and the participative character of 
the proceedings.183 Village elders incorporated the parties into 
their decision making process and ultimately made well-
informed decisions that were permanent and sensitive to local 
customs.184 LAs would be far more effective if they incorporated 
the parties and village elders into the process in the way the NPs 
did. 
Third, using specialists other than judges ensures that all 
interests and concerns of the parties can be addressed, which 
was one of the original goals of LAs.185 There is a better chance 
of appropriate and long-lasting conciliation if panel members 
such as presiding judges, social workers, and community leaders, 
know as much information about the dispute, the parties, and 
the local culture as possible before making a collective decision 
on each case.186 Therefore, a well-rounded panel of judges is the 
most suitable format for LAs. 
                                                                                                                                     
180. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text (describing the effect of 
culturally insensitive rulings). 
181. See supra notes 16–21 and accompany text (describing the history and 
successes of the NPs). 
182. See supra notes 120–25, 129–31 and accompanying text (noting various 
examples and effects of cultural insensitivity in the LA system). 
183. See supra notes 16–23 and accompany text (describing the prior successes of 
the NPs). 
184. See supra notes 16–23 and accompany text (describing the reception of 
rulings by the parties involved). 
185. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (describing the original goals 
of the LAs). 
186. See supra notes 120–25, 129–31 and accompanying text (describing the 
importance of cultural understanding in making an appropriate ruling in LAs). 
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Fourth, in order to re-introduce the LA system and show 
how effective it can be, the Indian courts should encourage 
mandatory referral to LAs. India has already tried to make a 
mediation system work but has not been as successful as it could 
be.187 Therefore, participants in LAs in many cases already have 
a negative perception of them.188 Mandatory referrals can help 
parties overcome their prejudices or lack of understanding of 
the process. 189  Initially, in order to combat the negative 
perception of LAs, mandatory referrals would bring more 
parties into the system without sacrificing the possibility of 
resolution. Subsequently, once LA popularity is restored, 
mandatory referrals would no longer be necessary because 
parties would use them voluntarily. 
Fifth, there needs to be requirements for attendance and 
good faith participation by the parties. Currently, lawyers and 
judges impact LAs to the detriment of the parties involved.190 
Appropriate penalties for bad faith could be reduced access to 
the community, chastisement by the elders, or, more 
legitimately, entry of a default judgment for the other party. 
This would result in a single focus on reaching an appropriate 
conciliation between the parties without ulterior motives 
distorting the process. 
Sixth, Indians need to be better informed about the LA 
system and resolution possibilities. Uninformed parties do not 
understand how mediation operates and its advantages and 
disadvantages when deciding whether or not to use mediation.191 
As a result, parties often do not achieve appropriate resolutions 
to their disputes.192 Instead, they agree to any offer believing it is 
                                                                                                                                     
187. See supra Part II.A (describing the problems with the LAs). 
188. See supra notes 100–03, 105–06, 113–19, and accompanying text (describing 
examples of dissatisfaction with LAs and adverse impacts on participants because of 
problems in the system). 
189. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (noting people’s concerns 
with the LA system). 
190. See supra notes 100–19 and accompanying text (noting the ineffectiveness of 
lawyers and judges in the LAs). 
191. See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text (describing the power of 
information in disputants’ ability to make informed decisions). 
192. See supra notes 100–19 and accompanying text (noting poor outcomes for 
disputants in LAs and inefficiencies and obstacles in the system). 
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their only choice. 193  Parties that are represented or 
unrepresented must also be provided with knowledge during 
the mediation process in order to make informed decisions 
regarding negotiations and the outcome. Since attorneys should 
not be required in LAs, the judges and legal aid systems must be 
involved.  
Ultimately, the LA system should look much different than 
it currently does.194 LAs should be held on a consistent basis. 
LAs should use the Internet and cellular technology to inform 
people of when they will be held, to facilitate payment of 
settlements, and for other necessary communications. 195  A 
judge, a social worker, and local community member should sit 
on the panel.196 During the decision-making process, the local 
community member would be able to provide the panel with 
information on local customs, and background on the parties 
and the dispute.197 The social worker would be able to provide 
information on emotional and societal issues that are part of the 
dispute and make recommendations that would benefit both 
parties.198 Finally, the judge’s training would ensure that the 
protections of the Constitution are extended even at the local 
level.199 All parties would work together to come up with a 
socially desirable solution, in which everyone would have 
contributed and all important evidence would be considered.200 
                                                                                                                                     
193. See supra notes 107–16 and accompanying text (noting the lack of power 
participants in the LAs have). 
194. Compare supra notes 100–19 and accompanying text (noting the problems 
with the LA system), with supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting how the lack of 
resources prevents LAs from being held more often and in accordance with demand). 
195. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the lack of resources in 
the LA system). 
196. See supra notes 100–12 and accompanying text (noting the discordant 
relationship between judges and lawyers in the LA system currently), see also supra notes 
154–61 and accompanying text (noting how cultural sensitivity is instrumental in 
fostering conciliation). 
197. See supra notes 16–23 and accompanying text (describing the prior successes 
of the NPs); see also supra notes 25–40 and accompanying text (discussing the 
importance of cultural recognition and understanding on the part of judges in the LA 
process). 
198. See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text (describing how important 
relevant information is to issue a proper ruling). 
199. See supra note 127 (describing the lack of constitutional protection in rural 
areas). 
200 . See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing the desire for 
conciliation and settlement in rural India). 
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CONCLUSION 
The LA system has the opportunity to live up to the goals of 
providing the public with an effective and informal dispute 
resolution mechanism as it had originally set out to accomplish. 
It can simultaneously relieve the burdens of the formal legal 
system and bring informal legal remedies to those that do not 
believe strongly in the justice system. To achieve these 
objectives, LAs should take lessons from ADR experiments 
abroad, along with lessons from Indian experiments, and adapt 
them to the culture and traditions of the rural Indian 
population. 
 
